Research
My research explores questions within and across managerial labor markets, multi-unit firm structure, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). I examine the dynamics of managerial mobility, its role in post-M&A integration, CEO selection and succession, gender inequality in executive advancement, and the effects of artificial intelligence on managerial labor markets. Across these topics, I explore how managerial and organizational dynamics shape firm behavior and performance.
Publications
Post-M&A Retention of Top Managers: The Role of Structural Knowledge
Best Paper, STR Division · Academy of Management 2023
Abstract
This study examines the role of managerial structural knowledge in postacquisition integration (PAI) and its association with the retention of target firm managers. Although retaining top managers is often linked to improved acquisition outcomes, the conditions under which their retention may support integration remain underexplored. Drawing on organizational modularity theory, we theorize that structural similarity between acquiring and target firms is associated with higher managerial retention in related acquisitions. We propose that structural knowledge, defined as managers’ experience within specific organizational structures, can support PAI and is associated with improved postacquisition performance. Using a data set of 2,941 mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals and 18,987 target firm managers (1994–2018), we find a positive relationship between structural similarity and the retention of target managers in related acquisitions. At the individual level, managers with structural knowledge aligned with the acquiring firm’s structure are more likely to be retained. Furthermore, the relationship between structural similarity and retention is stronger when the geographic distance between firms is greater or when the deal requires deep integration, as in absorption-type acquisitions. Finally, structural similarity between acquiring and target firms is positively associated with improved postacquisition performance. Our findings contribute to the M&A literature by introducing a structural knowledge perspective in understanding PAI. Our study also highlights the role of organizational modularity in M&As and advances the strategic human capital literature by identifying structural knowledge as a critical component of managerial capabilities.
Organization Science. Copyright © 2026 The Author(s). doi:10.1287/orsc.2024.18686. Used under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Firm Divisionalization and the Gender Gap in CEO Promotion
Abstract
Research Summary: This study examines how divisionalized firm structures shape the gender gap in internal chief executive officer (CEO) promotion. We argue that divisionalized firms may narrow the gender gap in CEO succession by generating more individually attributable performance information about senior managers. In contrast to firms in which candidates’ contributions are difficult to isolate, divisionalized firms create profit-and-loss (P&L) accountability that makes managerial performance more visible and comparable. Using longitudinal data on over 616,000 managers in 49,135 US firms, we find that women are more likely to be promoted to CEO in divisionalized firms. We also find that the gender gap is smaller among managers with prior P&L-accountable experience. Among managers in divisionalized firms, stronger unit performance relative to within-firm peers is more positively associated with promotion to CEO for women than for men. The results highlight organizational structure as a potential source of variation in gender inequality in executive advancement.
Managerial Summary: Why do so few women become CEOs? Part of the answer lies in how firms are organized. When a company is structured into divisions with their own profit-and-loss responsibility, the results of the managers who lead those units are easier to observe, compare, and credit to the individual. This leaves less room for subjective judgments through which gender bias often enters promotion decisions. In data on more than 600,000 managers at roughly 49,000 US firms, we find that women are more likely to be promoted to CEO in divisionalized firms. The pattern is strongest for women who have led a business unit, and strong unit results count for more in women’s promotion prospects. For boards seeking greater gender equity in CEO succession, structures and evaluation systems that give senior leaders clear, comparable performance records may matter as much as diversity initiatives.
Strategic Management Journal. Copyright © 2026 The Author(s). doi:10.1002/smj.70128. Used under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Selected Working Papers
Best of Both Worlds: The Advantages of Hybrid CEOs in Multi-Unit Firms
Abstract
CEO succession research traditionally frames leader selection as a binary choice between insiders and outsiders, yet this dichotomy obscures meaningful heterogeneity within multi-unit firms. We develop theory on “hybrid” CEOs, executives promoted from subsidiaries to lead parent companies, who combine firm-specific knowledge with cognitive and social independence from headquarters. Using data on 2,090 CEO transitions across 1,456 U.S. multi-unit firms (1994–2017), we document that hybrid appointments constitute one-third of all successions. Both the likelihood of hybrid CEO appointment and their performance advantage exhibit inverted-U-shaped relationships with environmental volatility, peaking under moderate turbulence. Mechanism analyses show the advantage concentrates among hybrid CEOs who maintained the greatest structural distance from headquarters, supporting a capability rather than selection-based explanation. Our findings advance CEO succession theory by demonstrating that organizational structure, not just tenure, shapes executive capabilities and reveal subsidiaries as leadership laboratories producing executives uniquely suited for adaptive challenges.
Round Number Bidding as an M&A Strategy
- Academy of Management Proceedings, 2020
- Coverage from Anderson Review
Abstract
Round-number initial offers are pervasive in many bargaining situations. Such behavior is puzzling, given that making precise offers has been shown to be a superior strategy. To resolve this inconsistency, we examine offers in the market for mergers and acquisitions. We find that round-number offers are prevalent among initial bids for target companies. Following the initial bid, round-number offers have a higher probability of being increased, a lower probability of encountering challenging bids, and a shorter time to deal closure. This suggests that round numbers are often chosen strategically as a signal by impatient bidders who are willing to take a slight drive-up of price to secure a timely purchase and as a preemptive move to prevent competing bidders from entering.